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In Being and Time, the philosopher Martin Heidegger portrays the conscience in a different sense from 
another common, characterization of the conscience, where the conscience acts as a guide to satisfy a 
moral code. Instead, for Heidegger, the conscience calls the human to ‘take up,’ or accept, the “who” that 
the human is, without measurement to an external, “ethical,” code. In “The Call,” I affirm Heidegger’s 
distinctive characterization of the conscience. I adjust Heidegger, however, to argue that we may 
understand the call of conscience as a call toward the ethical if we both understand Heidegger’s 
description of the call as different from our own and adjust our understanding of the “ethical” to reflect 
Heidegger’s different depiction of the call. I believe this adjustment is significant for ethics because it 




The conscience in Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time responds to what Heidegger 
perceives as the loss of individuals in societal generality (which Heidegger 
characterizes as “the they”). Turning away from this “inauthentic” loss, Da-sein, or the 
human being, heeds a call of conscience to resolutely face its true orientation toward 
death in “authentic” Being-toward-death. Heidegger is quite clear that, in the sense of a 
specific moral prohibition or the sense of an instrument of chastisement, the conscience 
is not ethical. I develop Heidegger’s characterization of the conscience to argue that we 
may indeed characterize the call of conscience as an ethical call if we both understand 
Heidegger’s description of the call as different from our own and adjust our 
understanding of “ethical” to reflect Heidegger’s different depiction of the call.  
 
A developed understanding of the use of the conscience in Heidegger first involves a 
discussion of “the they” from which the voice of conscience breaks. The experience of 
“the they” in Being and Time correlatively occurs with an experience of a sense of loss1 
                                               
1
 I say “sense of loss”, because Heidegger makes it quite clear that Da-sein is not eliminated as a not-ness 
by its absorption in the ‘they’. Instead, Da-sein’s ontic experience of selfhood is taken over by the 
“they.”  
Quote: “In these characteristics of being which we have discussed—everyday being-among-one-another, 
distantiality, averageness, leveling down, publicness, disburdening of one’s being, and accommodation-
lies the initial ‘constancy’ of Da-sein [emphasis added]. . . Existing in the modes we have mentioned, the 
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of Da-sein as “it itself is not; the others have taken its being away from it.” (Being and 
Time 126)2 Loss occurs because as Da-sein itself becomes absorbed in the concerns of 
indefinite others (Kierkegaard’s public), a “neuter” ‘who,’ “the they” (Being and Time 
127), and as “the they” “dissolves one’s own Da-sein completely into the kind of being 
of the ‘others’ in such a way that the others, as distinguishable and explicit, disappear 
more and more.” (Being and Time 127)  
 
Da-sein’s falling prey to the “they” occurs as the opposite of the authentic care which it 
expresses in authentic Mitda-sein, a caring for things by letting them be encountered as 
they appear (Being and Time 115). In falling prey, Da-sein instead abandons its own 
cares and concerns and, with this abandonment, the particularity of its own situated 
state and expectations. Da-sein assumes the expectations and situation of the indefinite 
general public, and, as a result, the seemingly positive (as in presence) action of 
assumption, of taking up the concerns of “the they,” actually occurs as an apparently 
negative (absent) activity which alters the “ontic” (particular) individuality of Da-sein-
“the leveling down of all possibilities of being” (Being and Time 127). 
 
We may begin to identify the relevance of Heidegger’s description of the conscience in 
our everyday world by observing whether we use words to describe a similar 
phenomenon and what those words signify for us. An example of lostness in “the they” 
occurs when, as Heidegger observes, our actions implicitly signal our use of the neuter 
voice ‘one’. The Importance of Being Earnest incessantly jabs at the “One must” which 
its Victorian public employs to replace the ethical conscience with a fear of social 
stigma, but this same “one must,” though not mentioned with identical phrasing, also 
appears in our contemporary world. The politicized language of the national “we” who 
bring democracy to the nations, our preoccupation with the latest “socially conscious” 
fads, and the increase of mass media and instant communication, reveals a growing and 
a heightened absorption in the “they” of the public. 3 The “we must” comes to mean 
what the Victorians called “one must,” and, with this equivalence, evidences the 
Heideggerian “they.” 
 
In a troubling movement evidenced by socially conscious ads, the “I” may soon join, or 
already have joined, the “one” and the “we” as the impersonal pronoun of the “they.” 
One recent press release, out of many, indicates this combined identification in its 
advertising technique:  
 
                                                                                                                   
self of one’s own Da-sein and the self of the other have neither found nor lost themselves [emphasis 
added] . . . On the contrary, in this kind of being Da-sein is an ens realissimum [no emphasis added], if 
by “reality” we understand a being that is like Da-sein.” (Being and Time 128) 
 
2
 Citations are from the side notations. 
 
3
 “Socially conscious” functions as a telling phrase eo ipso.   
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“Synergy beads, the hot new Eco-Zen bracelets, goes international.”  
Quote: “The new company is truly breaking ground in record time. Within its 
first two months of existence, the fashionable bracelets found their way into a 
Nashville charity VIP gift bag that included some of country music’s biggest 
names as recipients. Vision Magazine’s June 2009 edition, the chic holistic 
California magazine, said, “When you wear a Synergy Beads bracelet, you are 
supporting a conscious company, receiving a blessing to shift your perception, 
and helping to heal the Earth. What more could you ask for?”4      
 
The release identifies environmental responsibility with personal gratification via 
trendy conformism and highlights the modern era’s identification of the “I” with the 
“they.” We are disparately encouraged both to seemingly promote our individual selves 
by the promotion of individual freedoms or by the instant gratification of our own 
desires and to adjust our individual selves to adopt a universal notion of freedom or to 
align with universal trends. The voice of our individual conscience becomes numbed.  
 
Da-sein’s absorption in the “they” appears to detach itself from personal responsibility, 
the role of the conscience. Da-sein converts its “I said,” where the “I,” must take 
responsibility for speech and action, to the “they said”, which “can most easily be 
responsible for everything because no one has to vouch for anything.” (Being and Time 
127) War crimes trials often reveal this conversion from the “I” to “we” to “the they,” 
where the defendants are quick to blame their actions on the “they” of their superiors, 
and the guidelines for who should assume responsibility appear indeterminate. The 
“they” tranquilizes, as Da-sein becomes comfortable with simply assuming its 
understanding which is itself a farce. “Fundamentally it remains undetermined and 
unasked what is then really to be understood” (Being and Time 178), Heidegger 
observes. 
 
It is this response to the “they,” I think, that we want to address when we introduce the 
conscience in our everyday sense as a refusal to go along with the crowd. “Stand up for 
what is right,” we are urged. We sense in the conscience a sense of self which is 
different from the undifferentiated “they.” In contrast with Heidegger, however, what 
we term “what is right,” often simply signifies what is already determined by the “they” 
to be an inflexible rule, and, perhaps, even a moral law which we are obligated to 
follow.  
 
In this sense, our everyday understanding of the conscience occurs as different from 
Heidegger’s. We often uphold an impossibility of two extremes: in the one, we 
                                               
4
 Ancira, Adam. “Synergy Beads, the Hot New Eco-Zen Bracelets, Goes International.” June, 2009. 
Synergy Beads. Web. <http://www.bignews.biz/?id=802799&keys=eco-international-fashion-spiritual> 
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privilege what Kierkegaard calls the “dogmatic,”5 as we see the essence of the 
conscience as a touchstone of response to established moral norms of behavior which 
we identify with the ethical. When we discuss the activity of the conscience, however, 
we characterize it simply as an indefinable “inner voice” which, in its unpredictability 
and apparent ambiguity, offers itself as an indeterminate guide for behavior because of 
its contrast with these norms. Perhaps Heidegger does not identify his conscience with 
the ethical due to these two conflicting understandings. I believe, however, that 
Heidegger’s interpretation may offer a third, and a more appropriate, understanding of 
the conscience than these two understandings, and one which may restore our 
understanding of the conscience and of the ethical.  
 
Heidegger terms this position of being taken in by the “they,” disclosed in idle talk, 
curiosity, and ambiguity, “the entanglement of Da-sein.” (Being and Time 164) Da-sein 
has fallen “away from itself” (Being and Time 176; more on this later) and into a 
groundlessness, as Da-sein becomes absorbed with fleeting and changing interests 
(curiosity) and chatter (idle talk), which distract it from what it is primordially 
concerned about—Being-toward-death. Da-sein, although still present as existing 
Being, moves from authenticity to in-authenticity, from one kind of integrated being-in-
the-world to another kind where it is absorbed by the world. In the second kind, Da-sein 
still exists, as salt dissolved into saltwater still remains salt, but its individual identity is 
covered up. 
 
One notable distinction, however, between the saltwater example and Da-sein’s falling 
prey exists: Da-sein is always already in the world, whether authentically or 
inauthentically. The authentic mode of being-in-the-world both enables Da-sein to 
authentically ‘find itself’ and does not separate Da-sein from the world as a subject 
from an object. “Da-sein initially finds ‘itself’ in what it does, needs, expects, has 
charge of, in the things at hand which it initially takes care of in the surrounding world” 
(Being and Time 119). In authenticity, Da-sein does not lose the world; it instead 
encounters the world as the world is.  
 
Similarly, the inauthentic mode of being-in-the-world of falling prey does not result in 
Da-sein existing more “in the world” than in the authentic mode. Da-sein, instead, 
becomes undifferentiated as it loses its awareness of its individual facticity—its given 
situation which provides the objects, situation, and people it encounters that enable it to 
discover itself in its interests. A person walks into the room and engages me in 
conversation. I discover that she has a slapstick sense of humor. Assuming that I have 
never encountered this type of humor before, I am surprised to discover that I 
appreciate her jokes. My friends, however, have a different sort of humor, and are quick 
to dismiss hers, so I go along—“How silly! Who would ever think she’s funny?” In 
                                               
5
 Which I also am not so eager to discard-I agree that the dogmatic as Kierkegaard understands it must be 
relinquished, but I am hesitant to say that this is all the dogmatic is.  
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both my hasty and pressured dismissal and my groundless gossip I have, without 
realizing it, fallen prey to the “they.” 
 
Heidegger’s language of inauthenticity, falling away, “temptation” (Being and Time 
177), and guilt, may suggest to Western ears an Augustinian, or, at the very least, a 
Christian soteriology, where the self is called by the outside voice of the divine to the 
restoration of divine goodness and to the living of a moral life. Heidegger, however, 
distances himself from this Christian reading of ethics as he is unwilling, unlike the 
Christians, to move the locus of both the fall and the restoration away from Da-sein, 
situated in the world. The possibility of idle talk and falling prey does not exist apart 
from Da-sein, Heidegger asserts, rather, the temptation comes from Da-sein itself. 
Similarly, Da-sein “brings itself back from the they” (Being and Time 268), not an 
outside voice apart from Da-sein. The discussion of Da-sein is, importantly, a 
discussion of the self-in-the-world. 
 
Here we must further adjust an understanding of ethics as a system of moral laws to 
reflect Heidegger’s discussion. As Kierkegaard observes, the problem of ethics occurs 
when dogmatic as an outside law evidences its insufficiency in the ethical, as ethics 
“points to ideality as a task and assumes that every man possesses the requisite 
conditions” (The Concept of Anxiety 16). We have stepped from the outside ideal “Love 
at all times” to “Anika does not love Flor after Flor enters into a room to complain 
about everyone outside of it.” This appears to be one instance, but the more Anika 
thinks, “I must love at all times to be a complete person,” the more she realizes the 
impossibility of this love, for she knows that she cannot love at all times. If we identify 
falling prey as “falling away from” an outside law, then we will perpetually be 
confronted with a paradox as we attempt to abstract Da-sein from its reality as Being-
in-the-world. Instead, Heidegger’s discussion of Da-sein as being-in-the-world may 
enable us to begin to understand the problem of the ethical and the dogmatic. 
 
It is the conscience, a “phenomenon of Da-sein” (Being and Time 269), which brings 
Da-sein back from this falling prey as it modifies the “they-self” “so that it becomes 
authentic being-one’s-self.” (Being and Time 268) Where before, Da-sein did not 
choose for itself, but yielded the choice to the “they”, Da-sein now restoratively 
assumes its choice and “makes possible, first and foremost, its authentic potentiality-of-
being” (Being and Time 268). 
 
In Da-sein’s assumption of the choice to live authentically, where it finds itself 
primordially, conscience is revealed as existing “in the kind of being of Da-sein” 
(Being and Time 269). The word “in” does not depict conscience as an inner voice (or 
set of voices) apart from Da-sein as represented in some caricatures, where the devil 
and the angel each on a human shoulder and whisper advice to the unwitting subject. 
Instead, “in” differentiates the phenomenon of the conscience from “out”, and indicates 
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that conscience does not occur as an outside voice which calls Da-sein. Conscience, 
revealed as a call (Being and Time 269), calls from within.   
  
In this inwardness, conscience calls silently. Heidegger earlier paradoxically describes 
keeping silent as a possible mode of discourse, which is articulation. Heidegger, I 
believe, has describes a resonant truth. When we “hearken” (Being and Time 163), we 
first adapt ourselves to our given surroundings. We become aware of noises and voices 
other than that or those which we listen for. In our attentiveness, we are more ready to 
understand than to seek to be understood. Keeping silent holds what is to be said, as “in 
order to be silent, Da-sein must have something to say,” (Being and Time 154), and 
keeping-silent unfolds the something to being-with-others in hearkening.  
 
When we have discovered a truth that resonates with us, we are often eager to share it 
with everyone in a natural activity of delight, where we hasten to invite others into its 
disclosure. At some point, however, we may come to realize that a silent listening for 
the truth to further reveal itself invites a fuller disclosure than our immediate rush to 
blurt out our ‘understanding.’ We learn to listen and to wait for the voice to further 
speak as the “apophansis” (showing forth) of statement (Being and Time 154) occurs in 
a silent hearkening.  
 
Our awareness of this preferability of what we identify as a hearkening for the truth 
may in turn help us to understand what Heidegger means when we listen for the call of 
conscience.6 When we hear our individual calls, we do not rush out to share the call and 
our response. Instead, we silently listen in order to understand the call, and in this 
hearkening, partake in the call and become aware of it. We become aware of a call that 
comes “from me, and yet over me.” 
 
This curious language of “from” and “over” illuminates another potential problem in 
this discussion of the conscience which has not yet been addressed. Being-in-the-world, 
Heidegger writes, “initially” occurs “in the mode of the they” (Being and Time 130). 
Heidegger’s language of falling prey and of the conscience as the primordial 
interpretation of Da-sein, however, also uses words which suggest a “prior” 
understanding as a “primordial, ontological interpretation of Da-sein” (Being and Time 
233). “Which comes first,” we may ask, “the inauthentic ‘initially,’ or the authentic 
‘primordial’?”  
 
The question of “prior” may be resolved by our awareness of the paradox that 
Heidegger characterizes which our mortality presents. We, as mortal beings, are always 
already headed toward death, as to be human is to be mortal. Our entrance into the 
                                               
6
 I am comparing the attitude of listening in both situations, not identifying conscience as “the truth”. 
Conscience may be true, but I am not sure if that is all Heidegger means when he says we are “in the 
truth”.  
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world and assumption of humanity (not as a representation, but as an entering into 
being human-“being da-Sein”) is, as a result, a taking up of a primordial anticipation of 
departure. We still, however, have a sense of a future in our Being-in-the-world, as we 
take up our own projects, plans, and possibilities in everyday life. When we encounter 
our mortality in Angst, we are brought up short as we are attuned to the reality of the 
uncanny—not-Being-in-the-world—which is in our world.  
 
Although we are mortal, we are not always aware of our mortality, and here 
Heidegger’s “initially” enters. Initially, before we become aware of our mortality, we 
are preoccupied with our lostness in the “they”, and we “fall prey” as we fail to 
recognize the reality of our Being-towards-death. The conscience mediates between the 
“initially” and the “primordial” to call us to face our mortality, where we both 
acknowledge the lack or our initial lostness in “the they” in being-guilty” (Being and 
Time 287), and the conscience “is ready for Angst” (Being and Time 297) in 
resoluteness. Resoluteness “calls forth to the situation” (Being and Time 300) as we 
face Angst not helplessly, unable to act, but in care with an awareness of our Being-
toward death. The conscience calls from Da-sein and over Da-sein as a preparation for 
the uncanny which Da-sein has not yet faced.  
 
This understanding of the conscience as resoluteness offers a different approach to the 
earlier raised question of the contrasting depictions of the conscience. The conscience 
neither responds to an outside norm, for the call comes from da-Sein, nor occurs as 
undifferentiated, for it is a response to (or, better, “about”) its own Being-towards 
death. As Da-sein, it neither abstracts the ethical from the “world” in a flight to rigid 
dogma nor removes the “world” from the ethical. Instead, the conscience functions as 
an activity of Being-in-the-world.  
 
Perhaps Heidegger’s dynamic portrayal of the conscience offers an approach to better 
understand the ethical as involving a state of being as becoming; we are called not so 
much to be ethical as to be living ethically. By this statement I mean that we are called 
to live with the developing ethical consciousness that is the conscience which these 
norms attempt to instill rather than to seek to conform to the norms themselves. A state 
of becoming cannot be rigid; in fact, it must be a making new. Levinas writes in 
Reflection on the Philosophy of Hitlerism of the Heraclitean flow of the changing river 
of the spirit.7 Perhaps the idea of a river includes an accompanying riverbed, and 
perhaps living ethically does similarly involve the living of an objectively experienced 
truthful principle, in this sense the dogmatic, but the primacy in thought is given to the 
                                               
7
 Levinas calls this “a melancholy” of “an illusory present”, but I see understand the flow of the river as a 
vivifying flow which, as it introduces the living present, also carries traces of its past sources in its 
current. For a clear exposition of the living present and internal time consciousness, see Robert 
Sokolowski’s “Introduction to Phenomenology”.  
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flow of the river, and the principle, although necessary for the river’s existence, is a 
living one with contours and bends, ever open to new discovery.  
 
Here, though, I differ slightly from Heidegger. To live ethically is to follow the call of 
conscience which calls us to fall into the Heraclitean river, and, asymptotically, to 
always further release ourselves into its current. We are awaiting death, but this 
awaiting occurs in, in an addition to Heidegger, primarily as a release and secondarily 
as resoluteness, for we must release our control—our ‘understanding’ of the ethical as a 
static norm or principle, and our inauthentic ambiguity which we call understanding--
before we can begin to live ethically, resolutely, and authentically towards death.  
 
When we follow the call of the conscience, we follow the call to live ethically as living-
and Being-in the truth. This is not disheartening constraint, it is, in fact, purest 
liberation, and as therefore, it is the most authentic realization of the choice which 
conscience offers to reclaim our own selves. Our authenticity is encountered in the 
united movement of the conscience with the ethical which is our Being-in-the-world. 
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